ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The use of funds of others in a business requires that returns be given on such funds in addition to the repayment of initial funds obtained for use in the firm. For owners of the firm, dividend may be a necessary reward for providers of funds. The higher these dividends, the satisfied are these owners who see such financial investments as rewarding, and thus attractive to non-owners to invest in. Financial theory supports this idea for such investors to desire holding into such stocks, and others desiring to acquire such stocks. Payment of this rewards, dividend, signals good prospects for firms, Finnerty (1986) observed from his study of American firms over a 40 years period that smaller and younger firms do not play cash dividend to their shareholders. However, he added, at some point in life cycle of any firm it begins paying common dividends. Continuing, he observed that between 80% and 90% of common stocks listed on the New York stock Exchange in any year, pay cash dividends during the year. Park (2009) observed that dividend payments are associated with firms with good corporate governance; concluding that firms in "legal regimes that focus on protecting investors are more likely to pay" even "higher dividends than firms in legal regimes with less investor protection".
Determinants identified in financial theory as affecting dividend paying behavior of firms are the availability of cash with which to pay the dividend, amount payable, government regulations, covenant restrictions in business transactions and the availability of viable investment options for dividend-proposed funds. With these, firms strive to continue regular dividend payments to keep themselves attractive to investors; highlighting the proposed amounts when issuing dividend declarations. Firms exhibit a strong aversion to reducing their dividend rates (Frankfurter and Wood, 2000) . Reduction in this rate is interpreted by investors as a signal that the firms earning prospects have worsen; though firms in periods of adversity, reduce dividends rate when factors causing such adversities are obvious.
Reductions in dividends rates adversely affect a firm's share price, and in such cases the share prices of firms in the same industry as investors may interpret such reductions as industry affected.
Dividend is also often mixed with capital investment decisions. Investors' characteristics determine whether dividend payment is necessary or not. Some prefer current income streams with higher relative tax rates to differed income, capital gains, with lower relative tax rates in the present inflationary situation. Use of margin loans for equity investment purposes, require the generation of current regular income to service and pay such cash loans. The present harsh economic environment, high interest rate, low income, high cost of goods, and delayed salaries make it necessary for investors to receive current regular income to augment earned income and meet socio-economic needs. These needs in Nigeria are basically the physiological needs enumerated by Maslow (1954) : shelter, safety, security (financial and physical) and love (family and attendant needs).
The agency theory of dividends posits that dividends mitigate agency costs by distributing free cash flows that firm managers would have spent on unviable investments. The likelihood of firms seeking new funds from outside sources by the distribution of cash through dividend payments has been accepted in finance literature as a cause for scrutiny by the capital market. This scrutiny by the market according to Kowalewski et al. (2007) help in alleviating opportunistic managerial behaviours, and cost of agency. Gompers et al. (2003) in their study related agency costs to the strength of shareholder rights; further relating them to corporate governance. The outcome of the two agency models of dividend test by La reveal that dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressurize managers to reduce cash flow in the firms; predicting that firms with weak shareholder rights need to establish a reputation for not exploiting minority shareholders, concluding that such firms pay dividends more than firms with stronger shareholder rights. Commenting, Bebczuk What is the impact of this level of corporate governance on the dividend policy of Nigerian firms?
Objective of the Study
The objective of this paper is to determine the impact of corporate governance practices of quoted firms in Nigeria on the dividend policy of these firms.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy
The agency theory posit that dividend mitigates agency costs by the distribution of free cash flow that otherwise would have been spent by corporate managers on unprofitable projects. Easterbrook (1984) argued that dividends payments expose firms to more scrutiny by the capital market as the payout of dividend increases the livelihood of such firm issuing new shares to meet their financing needs which on the other hand help alleviate opportunistic management behaviours and thus agency cost. Gompers et al. (2003) relate agency costs to the strength of shareholders rights which are associated with corporate governance. Agency theory further suggested that shareholders may prefer dividends particularly when they fear their funds may be expropriated by insider management. Finance literatures Shao et al. (2008) ; Shleifer and Vishney (1986) suggest that minority shareholders are usually at risk in companies controlled by strategic shareholders.
With lack of an independent board of directors, many companies in Nigeria and most Europeans countries (Kowalewski et al., 2007) and South Korea (Black et al., 2006) there is the likelihood of firms being vulnerable to potential expropriation. Black (1990) found no explanation why firms pay cash dividends to their shareholders. Since this work, research at answering this question seemed based on information asymmetries between firms' insiders and outsiders, with suggestions that firms indicate their future profitability by paying dividends. Gomes (1996) ; Fluck (1998) and Myers and Majluf (1984) recognize that dividend policies address agency problems between corporate insiders and shareholders. Furthering this argument, Grossman and Hart (1980) noted that dividend payouts of firms mitigates agency conflicts by reducing the amount of free cash flow available to managers who in most cases do not act in the best interest of shareholders. Commenting, Jensen (1986) argued that firms with substantial free cash flow may be coerced to accept investment projects with negative cash flows.
This takes care of the agency problem by reducing the available cash in the firm through the payment of dividend leaving nothing for investment in zero-net present value projects, which would have generated future agency problems.
The issue of new shares to raise funds earlier identified by Easterbrook (1984) results in increased monitoring by the capital markets and investment banks. Shleifer and Vishney (1986) and Allen et al. (2000) noted that institutional investors prefer to own shares of firms that pay regular dividend; arguing that big institutional investors are usually willing and able to monitor corporate managers than smaller owners. As a result, Kowalewski et al. (2007) noted that corporate dividend policies can thus be made to meet the needs of institutional investors, whom they think will introduce corporate governance practices. The La outcome model suggest that dividends are paid because minority shareholders put pressure on corporate insiders to reduce available cash in the firm. The substitution model by Brockman and Unlu (2009) predicts that firms with weak shareholders rights need to establish a reputation for not exploiting shareholders. Hence, such firms they advised should pay higher dividends than firm with strong shareholder rights. In other words, dividend paid by them substitute for minority shareholders rights. Bebczuk (2005) observed that because of the above argument there is higher likelihood of firms with good governance practices paying dividends. Ownership of large percentage of shares in a firm according to Barclay and Holderness (1989) reduce the probability of takeover bids, reducing the value of the firm; which is further reduced by the role of a clique of shareholders in selecting managers and board chairmen.
In this instance of control of a firm by a few shareholders, Bukart and Fausto (2001) observed that minority shareholders' interests will not be protected, creating severe agency problem. To solve this, ownership and management of such firm should be separated. The separation may be difficult as owner-managers have the tendency to establish their desire on the firm, control it and discourage dividend payments.
In their study of European business groups, La showed that those with controlling shareholders have strong incentives to siphon resources out of member firms to increase their individual wealth. In their observation of this likely trend, Bertrand et al. (2000) noted that there are strong incentives for owners of firms in India to divert resources of their firms. The absence and/or presence of investors protecting laws increases and/or decrease the advent of these practices.
Commenting, Gompers et al. (2003) observed that the severity of agency costs is likely inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights. To them firms exposed to agency conflicts are more likely to experience wider divergence of ownership and control especially where shareholders' rights are suppressed. By implication, shareholders' rights are related to agency problem and also to dividend policy. This nexus between corporate governance and dividend policy were established by Gillan et al. (2003) and Black et al. (2006) . The presence and enforcement of civil laws protecting investor negates these negative propositions in capital markets. 
Theories of Dividend Policy
Theories by researchers on dividend payouts and patterns are based on the perceptions, information carrying content and problem-solving ability of the payouts and patterns. The bird-inhand theory was developed by and Walter (1963) in which they concluded that investors always prefer cash in hand rather than a future promise of capital gain, implying higher current dividend payout and smoothening to investors.
The catering theory by Baker and Wurgler (2004) suggest that managers pay dividend according to the needs and wants of the shareholders, implying the determination of shareholder characteristics; and payout ratio and pattern according to the identified characteristics. Thus firms with more low income-earning shareholders need to have a high payout ratio and smoothened dividend while firms with large number of high income-earning should maintain low dividend payout ratio and less dividend smoothening.
Under the signaling theory by Bhattacharya (1979) and extended by John and Williams (1985) dividend payout and pattern allay information asymmetric between managers and shareholders by delivering inside information of firm future prospects. Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the agency based on the conflict between managers and shareholders to which dividend payout and pattern acceptable to shareholders should resolve. The life-cycle theory of dividend payout and pattern was developed by Lease et al. (2000) and extended by Fama and French (2001) 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Population for the Study
The population for this study is the 194 firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange with dividend paying history.
Study Samples and Sampling Techniques
57 listed firms with dividend paying history are sampled for the study using the strata sampling technique. Sampled firms occupy the top strata of the dividend paying dividend category.
Validity and Reliability of Data
Data on firm dividend payout for this study were obtained from analysis of annual firm dividend per share in relation to annual firm earnings in annual reports of sampled firms. These reports are prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1999 and the Nigerian Stock Exchange requirements, and were audited by external auditors and are thus valid and reliable.
Data for this Study
Data for this study is presented in fig 1: Figure- 
Data Analysis
To capture the characteristics of Nigerian firms, the transparency index is generated to construct the corporate governance index. X 2 was used to determine the impact of corporate governance measured by the World Bank corporate transparency index: on family ownership disclosures, indirect ownership disclosures, beneficial ownership disclosures, shareholder agreement disclosures, internal audit of financials and public availability of ownership details, on dividend policy of Nigerian firms, measured by their relative payout ratios. The hypothesis:
H o : Corporate governance practices of Nigerian firms do not affect their dividend policy will be tested on the assured relationship between identified variables using the chi-square technique on 29 (having corporate governance indices) of the 57 sampled firms:
Where O i = observed frequency; E i = expected frequency on the data on table 2.
The test carries (r-1) (c-1) = (3-1) (3-1) =4 degrees of freedom. ά=10%.
Thus t X 2 0.10,4 =13.277. Thus Cal X 2 = 3.5136.
Since cal X 2 ≤13.277, the null hypothesis is accepted. Thus corporate governance practices of Nigerian firms do not affect their dividend policy.
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
From the above graph we see that firms in the banking, automobile and tyres, printing and publishing, petroleum marketing sub-sectors' dividend pay-outs cluster around the industry averages; showing a desire to maintain what is obtainable within the industry. In the food and beverages, brewery, conglomerates, chemical and paints, building materials and healthcare subsectors, we observe that firms pattern their pay-out ratios to that of the industry leaders. Changes in pay-out ratios of these firms seem to be in response to changes in the pay-out ratio of the industry leader.
The need for smoothening dividend supported by findings by Lintner (1956) is not reflected in the dividend behaviour of Nigerian firms. Only the food and beverages, printing and publishing and the banking sub-sectors have their dividends smoothened. The conglomerates and petroleum marketing sub-sectors maintained a low dividend with steady growth pattern. The automobile and tyres, brewery, building materials, chemicals and paints, construction, healthcare, industrial/domestic products, and insurance sub-sectors show dynamic dividend behaviours:
increasing-decreasing-increasing and decreasing-increasing-decreasing patterns with no explanation by any dividend theory. While a fairly above average pay-out ratio was maintained by the food and beverages sub-sector, the automobile, banking, printing and publishing sub-sectors maintained a below average pay-out ratio during the 2006-2012 years.
Good corporate governance is relevant for poor countries, including Nigeria, seeking equity from business partners. Preventing expropriation and exposing it when it occurs, requires legal protection of shareholders, enforcement capabilities and disclosure of ownership and financial information.
Nigerian investors benefit greatly from this legal protection from redress and regulatory protections. If expropriations are unpunished, few Nigerian investors will invest in quoted firms.
These findings imply that quoted firms will not reach an efficient size for lack of financing as few investors will invest in such firms, and economic growth from increased capacity utilization and increased income from dividend flows will be hindered.
Differences among countries in the structure of laws and their enforcement explain the prevailing differences in financial markets worldwide and show that financial development of these markets is promoted by better protection of investors. The severity of agency costs in Nigerian firms is inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights, exposing them to agency conflicts between directors, director-shareholders and numerical majority non-controlling shareholders which from empirical study of Gompers et al. (2003) is related to the dividend payout ratios of firms.
Findings from tested hypothesis implies that clique of few numerical minority shareholders Disclosures are made to fulfill requirements to which there is no verification of the authenticity of such disclosures by corporate regulators.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From research results, we conclude that: give all shareholder equal decision powers on dividend decisions.
